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Abstract
In this paper we propose a new scheme for ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption that allows outsourcing
of computationally expensive encryption and decryption steps. The scheme constitutes an important building
block for mobile applications where both the host and users use mobile devices with limited computational
power. In the proposed scheme, during encryption the host involves a semi-trusted proxy to encrypt a partially
encrypted (by the host) message according to an access policy provided by the host. The proxy is unable to learn
the message from this partially encrypted text. A user can only decrypt the stored ciphertext if he possesses
secret keys associated with a set of attributes that satisfies the associated policy. To reduce computational load
in the decryption step, the user, in his turn, involves a semi-trusted proxy (e.g. a cloud) by deploying the scheme
of Green et al. (2011). The cloud is given a transformation key that facilitates construction of an El Gamalciphertext from the original ciphertext if the user's attributes satisfy the ciphertext. This El Gamal-ciphertext can
be then efficiently decrypted on the user's resource-constrained device. The resulting ABE scheme with
encryption and decryption outsourcing is proven to be secure in the generic group model.
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INTRODUCTION
Nowadays we observe the spread of distributed systems in which sensitive data has to be shared with multiple
parties. In order to facilitate these distributed systems, a network infrastructure can be used to allow shared
storage (e.g. in the cloud) and access to the systems' resources. Although this new paradigm offers a number of
advantages by eliminating organizational boundaries and increasing operational flexibility, it requires extra
security mechanisms needed to protect sensitive data involved. Unlike in traditional situations where one party
encrypts a message for another targeted party, distributed (collaborative) systems require more flexibility in the
way access to their resources is regulated, allowing access to parties that satisfy an access policy rather than to a
specified set of parties.

Figure 1 Architecture for a typical ABE
Attribute-based encryption (ABE), introduced by Sahai and Waters (2005), offers an expressive way to define
asymmetric-key encryption schemes for policy enforcement based on attributes. Here both a user secret key and
ciphertext are associated with sets of attributes. There are two flavours of ABE defined, i.e. ciphertext-policy
attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) and key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE). In CP-ABE, see e.g.
Bethencourt et al. (2007), Ostrovsky et al. (2007), and Ibraimi et al. (2010), a user encrypts the data according to
a predicate (access policy) defined over attributes, such that only the party that possesses a secret key associated
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with the attribute set satisfying the predicate is able to decrypt the ciphertext, Figure 1. In KP-ABE of Goyal et
al. (2008) the idea is reversed. Here the ciphertext is associated with the attribute set and the secret key is
associated with the predicate defined over the attributes. CP-ABE schemes are more desirable due to their
flexibility allowing encryption according to the access policy.
In practice, in distributed systems data often has to be encrypted, transferred or accessed from portable devices,
such as e.g. smartphones. However, ABE schemes are typically computationally intensive, involving pairing
operations and exponentiations, and their computational complexity increases linearly with the size of the access
control policy (or number of attributes). Currently, an efficient realization of ABE schemes can be implemented
using conventional desktop computers. Portable devices, however, have limited computational resources making
it a challenging task to realize mobile applications with ABE schemes. Recently, Green et al. (2011) proposed
architecture with a corresponding modified ABE scheme that allowed reducing the computational load required
for ciphertext decryption on mobile devices by involving a semi-trusted server in the decryption process. In
Green et al. (2011) the ABE scheme is modified such that a user has to provide the server with a transformation
key that allows the server to translate any ABE ciphertext satisfied by the user's attributes into an El Gamalstyle ciphertext, without being able to learn any part of the encrypted message. The resulting El Gamal-style
ciphertext is then transmitted to the user, who can decrypt it in a computationally efficient way. This work,
however, does not address computational load reduction for the host that creates the access policy and the
ciphertext.

Figure 2 Architecture for ABE with Encryption and Decryption Outsourcing

Our Contribution: In this paper we propose a new attribute-based encryption scheme with encryption and
decryption (end-to-end) outsourcing that reduces the computational load for both the host and the user. Unlike
the original ABE scheme or the scheme of Green et al. (2011), our scheme involves two proxies, as shown in
Figure 2. Here we allow the host (data owner) to outsource cryptographic policy creation to a semi-trusted
entity or proxy (Proxy A), and to encrypt messages for users according to the given policy in such a way that the
proxy is a) unable to learn the encrypted message; and b) is enforced to encrypt the messages based on the
attributes specified by the policy. The decryption workload is reduced by allowing a user to outsource the policy
verification to another semi-trusted proxy (Proxy B) by allowing the proxy to verify the policy given the user's
transformation key attributes. The latter is realized with deploying the idea of Green et al. (2011). The security
of the proposed ABE scheme with encryption and decryption outsourcing is proven in the generic group model.
Paper Organization: The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Background section we provide
generic concepts used in the proposed scheme. ABE with encryption and decryption outsourcing section
presents the formal definition of our scheme and its security model. The next section describes the construction
of the proposed scheme. Finally, the last section concludes the paper.

BACKGROUND
We start with defining a number of concepts that provide the basis for our scheme.

Bilinear Groups
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Our proposed scheme is based on pairings over groups of prime order. Let
and
be two multiplicative
cyclic groups of prime order , be a generator of
, and
be the additive group associated with integers
from
. A pairing or bilinear map
satisfies the following properties:
1.

Bilinearity: for all

and

2.

Non-degeneracy:

.

, we have

Observe that bilinear map also enjoys the symmetry property, i.e.
Group
is said to be a bilinear group if the group operation in
be computed efficiently.

.

.
and the bilinear map

can

Access Tree
Another important concept used in this paper is the concept of an access tree. Let be an access tree associated
with an access policy. A leaf node in the access tree represents an attribute from the attribute set
,
where is a universe of attributes. A non-leaf node in represents a threshold gate, which is described by its
child nodes and a threshold value. Let
be the number of children of a node and
its threshold value,
then
. If
, then corresponds to an
gate; if
, the node is an
gate.
For leaf nodes,
.
Next we define the following functions on access trees. Denote by
the function that returns the parent
of a node in an access tree . Moreover, we define an ordering between children of a certain node in in the
following manner. Let the children nodes of be numbered from to
, then
returns the order
value associated with a child node . Finally, function
returns the attribute associated with a leaf node
of the access tree .
Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
The idea of Shamir’s secret sharing is to divide a secret into shares
such that knowing or
more secret shares one can easily recover , while the knowledge of only
or less shares of does not
suffices to reconstruct . Shamir’s secret sharing is information-theoretically secure. Schemes based on
Shamir’s secret sharing are also known as threshold secret sharing schemes and can be realized using
polynomial interpolation.
Let
denote a polynomial of degree
. The scheme then consists of two steps: 1) distribution of
shares – where secret
is distributed among users by giving each user one of distinct points (shares)
of a random polynomial
, which is created using
and
randomly selected coefficients
;
2) reconstruction of secret , where any group of or more users can reconstruct key by combining their
distinct shares and reconstructing the polynomial
using e.g. Lagrange interpolation. Then the secret is given
by

ABE WITH ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION OUTSOURCING
Next we define algorithms that constitute our proposed ABE scheme with encryption and decryption
outsourcing capability and present the security game for it.
Algorithms of the Proposed ABE Scheme
In the proposed scheme the host and the user can outsource part of encryption and decryption functionalities to
two independent semi-trusted entities, called proxies. We call the proxy used to outsource encryption proxy A
and the one for decryption proxy B (see also Figure 2). Our proposed scheme uses the following algorithms.
•

: This algorithm is run by a trusted authority. It takes as input a security parameter , and
outputs public parameters PK and a master secret key MK.

•

: This algorithm is also run by the trusted authority. It takes as input the
public parameters PK, the master secret key MK and a set of user’s attributes . The output of this step is
the secret key
for a user with the attribute set . Here
is composed of two parts, i.e.
and
, where
can be used by proxy B to assist in decryption, while
is used directly by the
user to recover a plain message from the partially decrypted ciphertext ̂ constructed by proxy B.

•

: This algorithm is used to generate a unique (per proxy) secret key for proxy
A that assists the host with encryption by constructing the access policy. The algorithm takes as input the
master secret key MK and public parameters PK. The output of this algorithm is
.
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•

•

: The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK, a message M,
and an access tree over a universe of attributes . It produces a partial ciphertext ̌ . This partial
ciphertext includes the access tree (structure) , but no cryptographic access policy associated with .
̌

: This algorithm is run by proxy A in order to create the final ciphertext
CT. It takes as input the partial ciphertext ̌ and the proxy encryption secret key
and creates the
cryptographic access policy related to the access tree .
Note that the proxy secret key
does not suffice to recover the message M, and the proxy is only
trusted with cryptographic access policy creation.

•

: This algorithm is run by proxy B that takes as input the proxy
decryption key
related to
and the ciphertext
. The output of this algorithm is a partially
decrypted ciphertext ̂ (called El Gamal style ciphertext) if satisfies access tree .

•

̂ : The user runs the decryption algorithm. The decryption algorithm takes as
input the partially decrypted ciphertext ̂ and a user’s secret key
(called El Gamal style private
key). The output of this stage is the decrypted message if satisfies , otherwise the output is an error,
denoted by .

Security Model for ABE with Encryption and Decryption Outsourcing
Now we define two security games for an adversary
and a challenger for the ABE scheme with encryption
and decryption outsourcing capability (ABE-EDO). In the first game,
asks for the secret keys of proxy A, i.e.
, while in the second game,
asks for the secret keys of the user, i.e.
. These games correspond to
the assumption we use in our model that proxy A and proxy B are independent of each other and will not
collude. The idea behind this assumption is to achieve a good separation of duties.

Game 1
Setup: The challenger runs Setup algorithm and gives the adversary
keeping the master secret key to itself.
Phase 1: The adversary

the public parameters, while

performs a polynomially bounded number of queries asking for secret keys
of proxy A. The challenger returns these secret keys to

Challenge: In this phase the adversary
submits two equal length plaintexts
and
from the
message space, on which
wants to be challenged. The challenger flips a random coin
and
returns the partial encryption of
(i.e. the encryption that does not contain the cryptographic policy) to
the adversary .
Phase 2: Repeat Phase 1 querying for the secret keys that have not already been queried for in Phase 1.
Guess: In this phase,
outputs a guess
.
attacking the scheme is

and wins if

. The advantage of the adversary in

Game 2
Setup: The challenger runs Setup algorithm and gives the adversary
keeping the master secret key to itself.

the public parameters, while

Phase 1: The adversary
performs a polynomially bounded number of queries and asks for the user
secret keys corresponding to the attribute sets
. The challenger returns the secret keys
to .
Challenge: In this phase the adversary
submits two equal length plaintexts
and
from the
message space, on which
wants to be challenged. Moreover, also gives the challenger an access tree
such that the queried secret keys from Phase 1 do not satisfy . The challenger flips a random coin
and returns the encryption of
under to the adversary .
Phase 2: Repeat Phase 1 querying for the secret keys that do not satisfy
queried for in Phase 1.

and that have not already been
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Guess: In this phase,
outputs a guess
attacking the scheme is
.

and wins if

. The advantage of the adversary in

Definition 1. An ABE-EDO scheme is secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most negligible
advantage in the aforementioned ABE-EDO security games, where the advantage is defined to be
.
Theorem 1. Let be an upper bound on the total number of group elements that an adversary
can receive
from queries she makes to the challenger for elements from the hash function
, group
,
, bilinear
map
, and from her interaction in the ABE-EDO security games. The advantage of the adversary in the
security game is
.
The security of ABE-EDO scheme can be proved using arguments similar to those in Shoup (1997), Bethencourt
et al (2007), or Boneh et al. (2005).

CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section we present the formal description of the algorithms for the ABE scheme with encryption and
decryption outsourcing capabilities. First, however, we outline its main idea.
In our scheme we assume that the host and the user can involve two independent semi-trusted entities (proxies)
to outsource computationally expensive encryption and decryption operations. During encryption a message
will be encrypted according to an access policy such that only a user whose attribute set satisfies will be
able to decrypt it. The resulting ciphertext consists of the encrypted message and cryptographic policy
components. Since policy creation is computationally expensive, this step is performed by involving a proxy
(Proxy A in Figure 2). This proxy is only trusted with policy creation. Therefore the host performs partial
encryption and gives to the proxy the information that consists of encrypted message, encrypted secret key for
the policy creation and a set of encrypted authorized attributes. In this way the proxy cannot learn the message
and is forced to create the access policy for the specified attributes. During decryption, a user will involve the
second proxy to perform computationally expensive pairing operations required to evaluate the access policy.
The user will provide the proxy (Proxy B in Figure 2) with a transformation key that allows the proxy to
evaluate the access policy and produce a partially decrypted ciphertext (El Gamal type ciphertext), if the user’s
attributes satisfy the access policy. The proxy is not able to learn the message using only ciphertext and the key
provided by the user. Note that our assumption and trust model explicitly excludes the collusion between that
Proxy B and Proxy A, otherwise it would be able to decrypt the message. Finally, the resulting El Gamal type
ciphertext can be efficiently decrypted by the user.
Let
denote the bilinear map, defined in Background section. A security parameter
determines the size of the groups. Moreover, let
and
be two collision resistant
hash functions, where
denotes a binary sequence of an arbitrary length. Finally, we define the Lagrange
∏
coefficient
, for
and being a set of elements from .
1.

: This algorithm is run by a trusted authority in order to generate system parameters, i.e. the
public key
and master secret key
. The algorithm selects a random generator
of prime order
and random variables
. In addition, it selects cryptographic hash functions
and
, and sets
. The public key
and master secret key
are set to be:
(

2.

)

: This algorithm is run by the trusted authority in order to generate the
secret key for a user with an attribute set
. The algorithm selects random variables
and
sets
to be:

with
(

)
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(

)
(

where

)

and

Here
is a short El Gamal type private key for the user, while
is a transformation key that
can be shared with a semi-trusted proxy B assisting the user with computationally expensive policy
evaluation.
3.

: This algorithm generates the secret key for proxy A. The proxy will use this
key to create the access policy specified by the host:

This key is used by proxy A to recover the component to be shared across the access structure
compute the cryptographic access policy.

in order to

Remark: If there are a number of proxies in the system, as a result of this algorithm, each proxy gets a
unique key
(i.e. unique will be used).
4.

This algorithm is run by the host (encryptor). To reduce computational load on
the host, the algorithm only produces a partial ciphertext, that consists of encrypted message
,
encrypted secret key and the set of authorized attributes. These latter components are used by Proxy A to
which calculation of cryptographic policy is outsourced. The algorithm selects a random value
and
computes a partial ciphertext as follow:
̌

5.

̆

(

(̌
related to the access tree
following steps:
a)

̃

̃

) This algorithm is run by proxy A in order to generate access policy
that has to be associated with the ciphertext . The proxy performs the

Decrypt ̃
̃
where ^

b)

( ) ).

^

.

Create the access policy

:

In this step, the proxy creates cryptographic components related to the access policy . It uses
Shamir’s secret sharing to distribute ^ among the leaf nodes of . More precisely, the algorithm
chooses a polynomial
for each node in in a top-down manner, starting from the root
node . First, for each node in the tree, it sets the degree
of the polynomial
to be one
less than the threshold value
of that node, i.e.
. Then, starting with the root node
, the algorithm sets
and selects at random
other points of the polynomial
in order to define the polynomial completely. For any other node , the algorithm sets
and selects the rest
points randomly to completely define
.
c)

Create ciphertext:
The final ciphertext

is composed as follows:
(

˘

^

)
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6.

: This algorithm is run by proxy B. It takes as input the
transformation secret key
, provided by a user and associated with a set of his attributes , and a
ciphertext . The algorithm verifies a user’s attribute set satisfies the access tree , and if so computes
and outputs a partially decrypted El Gamal style ciphertext ̂ .
The algorithm makes use of the recursive function
(a) leaf nodes , and for (b) internal nodes of .
a)

. We define this function for

:
Observe that each leaf node of the access tree is associated with a real-valued attribute. Then let
. Now, if
, we have
(

)

(
(

)

(˘

^

)
)

^

(

(

( ) )

)
(

( ))

^

If
b)

, then

, where

denotes failure.

(

):
For all nodes that are children of , the algorithm calls
(
). Its output
stored as
is used to determine whether the user has enough attributes to satisfy the policy.
Note that to satisfy the policy, there should be enough data points (i.e. satisfied child nodes) to
reconstruct the polynomial in the node and thus to reconstruct
. Let
be an arbitrary
-sized set of child nodes such that
,
. If there exists no such a set, then node
is not satisfied and the function returns . Otherwise, using polynomial interpolation, the
algorithm evaluates the following function:
∏
^

∏(

)

^

Partial decryption at the proxy: Proxy B has to verify if the user satisfies the access control policy
associated with , and to create an El Gamal ciphertext (partially decrypted ciphertext) that can be further
decrypted by the user. The proxy first evaluates the
function on the root node of . If
(
) returns , then is not satisfied by the attribute set associated with the
key
and thus the user’s secret key
. In this case, decryption fails and the algorithm returns .
Otherwise, if is satisfied, the decryption algorithm performs the following steps:
(
(˘

and outputs ̂
7.

(

)

(

^

)
)

).

̂ : This algorithm is run by the user. It takes as input the El Gamal style private
Decryption
key
and the partially decrypted ciphertext ̂ . The plain message can now be recovered as follows
((
(

) )
)
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented a new ABE scheme with encryption and decryption outsourcing capabilities.
The scheme relies on the use of two semi-trusted proxies, one used to outsource computationally expensive
encryption steps and another to outsource decryption steps. During the encryption process, a host involves the
encryption proxy to create cryptographic policy components for a set of specified attributes, in such a way that
the proxy cannot reveal the original message and is enforced to use the given attributes. During decryption, the
decryption proxy is used for policy evaluation. Upon successful evaluation (i.e. a user possesses an authorized
set of attributes), the proxy transforms the original ciphertext into the El Gamal type of ciphertext. The latter can
be then efficiently decrypted by the user. To guarantee security of the scheme, two proxies used in our scheme
have to be independent and non-colluding. The security of our scheme is proved in the generic group model.
The presented scheme plays an important role in applications where both the host and users are using
computationally constrained devices (e.g. mobile devices).
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